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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE
PART IV

Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University

This is the fourth in a series of articles examining the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal
cases.
RULE 701: LAY OPINION TESTIMONY

Rule 701 governs the admissibility of lay opinion
testimony. The rule provides that the opinion of a
nonexpert is admissible if "(1) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." According to the Staff
Note, Rule 701 "is in accordance with Ohio law as
it has developed prior to the adoption of the Rules
of Evidence." Notwithstanding this statement,
Rule 701 changes the formulation of the lay opinion rule.
The opinion rule is not designed to exclude testimony that is merely speculation or conjecture on
the part of a witness. The firsthand knowledge rule
serves that function. See Rule 602. Rule 701 incorporates the firsthand knowledge rule by requiring
that an opinion be "rationally based on the perception of the witness." The opinion rule is designed
to encourage witnesses to relate their knowledge
in concrete rather than abstract terms, to relate
primary sensory perceptions rather than inferences
or conclusions drawn from those perceptions. See
C. McCormick, Evidence 25 (2d ed. 1972).
According to the prior Ohio cases, the opinion
rule required that "witnesses shall testify to facts
and not opinions." Railroad Co. v. Schultz, 43 OS
270, 282, 1 NE 324, 331-32 (1885). The courts, however, recognized an exception: "[N]on-experts may,
in cases where it is not practicable to place before
the jury all the primary facts upon which they are
founded, state their opinions from such facts ... "
ld. This exception included opinions concerning
"questions of identity as applied to persons,
things, animals, or handwriting; and of the size,

color, and weight of objects; of time and distances; of the mental state or condition of another;
of insanity and intoxication; of the affection of one
for another; of the physical condition of another as
to health or sickness ... ; of values ... " Id. at 281.
See also State v. Auerbach, 108 OS 96, 98, 140 NE
507, 508 (1923) ("estimates of height, temperature,
speed, time, light, weight, identity, dimension, size
and distance.").
The exception was even broader than the above
cases suggest because the courts also recognized
that the decision to admit lay opinion testimony
was entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. In
Auerback the Supreme Court remarked: "It rests
within the sound discretion of the court whether
the witness may express an opinion or not." ld.
at 98.
Instead of adopting the fact-opinion dichotomy
along with an ill-defined exception, Rule 701
adopts a different formula. The standard under the
rule is whether a witness' opinion, based on firsthand knowledge, is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or to the determination of the issues in the case. This formulation of
the opinion rule was adopted because the traditional formulation was deficient in several
respects. First, the application of the traditional
rule turned an illusory fact-opinion dichotomy. This
proved unworkable because "there is no distinction in kind between fact and opinion; the distinction is one of degree." E. Morgan, Basic Problems
of Evidence 216 (1963). For example, a witness
who testifies that a defendant had "slurred
speech" and "staggered" when he walked, is using inferences as much as the witness who testifies that the defendant was "intoxicated;" the difference is "one of degree."
Second, witnesses frequently use inferences
while testifying since it is the natural way to tell a
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story. In some cases, it is the only way to tell a
story. A strict application of the opinion rule would
stultify the presentation of testimony. As Judge
Learned Hand commented:

determination of the litigated issue." /d. (syllabus,
para. 1). This test is similar to the test stated in
Rule 702. The McKay Machine Co. opinion uses
the term "aid" the jury; the rule uses the term
"assist" the jury. McKay Machine Co. as well as
other Ohio cases, however, also emphasizes that
the subject matter of expert testimony must be
beyond the "common knowledge of laymen." See
State v. Maupin, 42 OS(2d) 473, 479, 330 NE(2d)
708, 713 (1975) ("beyond the common experience
and knowledge of juries").
In one sense, focusing on the "common knowledge of laymen" does not differ from the standard
of Rule 702. If a matter falls within the "common
knowledge of laymen," the jury is presumed to be
knowledgeable about the matter and therefore expert testimony would not "assist" the jury. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the rule points in another
direction. Many subjects are not entirely beyond a
lay juror's comprehension and yet expert testimony should be admitted under Rule 702 because
it will assist the jury. Handwriting comparisons illustrate this point. Although the jurors may compare handwriting exemplars to determine common
authorship, a questioned document examiner's testimony is superior and would be admissible under
Rule 702.
The trial court has "broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless
manifestly erroneous." Salem v. United States
Lines Co., 370 US 31, 35 (1962). Accord, Fowler v.
Young, 77 App 20, 31, 65 NE(2d) 399, 405 (1945).
Qualifications of Expert Witnesses
Rule 702 provides that a witness may qualify as
an expert by reason of "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 702 contains the following comment: "[T]he expert is viewed, not in a
narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.'
Thus, within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense, e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group
sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses, such as
bankers or landowners testifying to land values."
Wigmore wrote that the witness' expertise "may
have been attained, so far as legal rules go, in any
way whatever; all the law requires is that it should
have been attained." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 556,
at 751 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
The Ohio cases have followed this approach. In
Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Medical Center, 56 OS(2d)
155, 383 NE(2d) 564 (1978), the Supreme Court commented: "It is a general rule that the expert witness is not required to be the best witness on the
subject ... The test is whether a particular witness
offered as an expert will aid the trier of fact in the
search for the truth." /d. at 159.
Determining whether a witness is qualified as an
expert is a decision for the trial court. Rule 104(A)
provides that "[p]reliminary questions concerning
the qualifications of a person to be a witness ...

Every judge of experience in the trial of causes has
again and again seen the whole story garbled,
because of insistence upon a form with which the witness cannot comply, since, like most men, he is
unaware of the extent to which inference enters into
his perceptions. He is telling the "facts" in the only
way that he knows how, and the result of nagging and
checking him is often to choke him altogether, which
is, indeed, usually its purpose. Central R.R. v.
Monahan, 11 F(2d) 212,214 (2d Cir.1926).

Third, the traditional rule is unnecessary. In
most instances the adversary system has built-in
mechanisms that mitigate the undesirable effects
of opinion testimony. Because "the detailed account carries more conviction than the broad
assertion, and a lawyer can be expected to display
his witness to the best advantage," counsel will
tend to elicit concrete rather than abstract testimony. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid.
701. Furthermore, opposing counsel can expose
through cross-examination the weaknesses in
opinion testimony. /d.
There are, however, limits on the types of opinions that may be admitted. As the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 701 points out, if
"attempts are made to introduce meaningless
assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is
called for by the rule." See Mynatt v. Drenik -Beverage Distributing, Inc., 119 App 28, 188 NE(2d) 612
(1963) (opinion as to fault excluded). In this
respect, several federal cases seem to have been
decided wrongly; they have admitted opinions concerning the mens rea of 9riminal defendants. See
United States v. McClintic, 570 F(2d) 685 (8th Cir.
1978); United States v. Smith, 550 F(2d) 277 (5th
Cir. 1977); but see United States v. Phillips, 600
F(2d) 535, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1979).
RULE 702: EXPERT TESTIMONY
Subject Matter of Expert Testimony
Rule 703 provides that an expert witness may
testify on a subject involving "scientific, technical,
otother specialized knowledge" if his testimony
"will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Wigmore's
formulation of the test for expert testimony is consistent with Rule 702: "On this subject can a jury
from this person receive appreciable help?" 7 J.
Wigmore, Evidence§ 1923, at 29 (Chadbourn rev.
1978). See also C. McCormick, Evidence 30 (2d ed.
1972).
The prior Ohio rule was stated in McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman, 11 OS(2d) 77, 228 NE(2d) 304
(1967): "In all proceedings involving matters of a
scientific, mechanical, professional or other like
nature, requiring special study, experience or
observation not within the common knowledge of
laymen, expert opinion testimony is admissible to
aid the court or the jury in arriving at a correct
2

shall be determined by the court ... " This is consistent with prior Ohio Jaw. In Turnpike Comm'n v.
Ellis, 164 OS 377, 131 NE(2d) 397 (1955), the
Supreme Court stated, "The qualification or competency of a witness to testify as an expert or to
give his opinion on a particular subject rests with
the trial court, and, on appeal, its rulings with
respect to such matters will ordinarily not be
reversed unless there is a clear showing that the
court abused its discretion." /d. (syllabus, para. 8).

In many jurisdictions, it seems permissible to have
the expert witnesses in court during the taking of testimony, and then when the expert is himself called as
a witness, to simplify the hypothetical question by
asking the expert to assume the truth of the previous
testimony, or some specified part of it and to state
his opinion upon that assumption. C. McCormick, Evidence 32 (2d ed. 1972).

Second, the underlying data may be supplied
through evidence that the expert reviewed prior to
trial, provided the evidence is eventually admitted
at trial. For example, a pathologist may base his
opinion as to the cause of death upon an autopsy
which he performed and a report of a toxicologist.
The autopsy involves the personal knowledge of
the pathologist and an opinion based on such
knowledge is permitted. If the toxicologist's report
is admitted as an official record or business
record, see Rules 803(6) & (8), the pathologist
could also base his opinion on that report. See
Kraner v. Coastal Tanker Lines, Inc. 26 OS(2d) 59,
269 NE(2d) 43 (1971). In effect, the pathologist
would be assuming the accuracy of the report.
Third, an expert may base an opinion on assumed facts that are presented to him in the form
of a hypothetical question. In Burens v. Industrial
Comm'n, 162 OS 549, 124 NE(2d) 724, (1955), the
Supreme Court commented: "[E]xpert witnesses
are not confined in their testimony to facts which
are within their own personal knowledge but may
state opinions which are based on assumed
facts .... Ordinarily, such an opinion is elicited by
a hypothetical question ... " /d. at 553. The Court
in Burens, however, recognized an important limitation on the use of hypothetical questions. "The
hypothesis upon which a expert witness is asked
to state an opinion must be based upon facts
within the witness' own personal knowledge or
upon facts shown by other evidence." /d. (syllabus,
para. 1). Thus, an expert opinion cannot be based
on assumed facts unless evidence tending to
establish the assumed facts has been admitted in
evidence. See Kraner v. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc.,
26 OS(2d) 59, 269 NE(2d) 43 (1971); Dillow v. Young,
6 OS(2d) 221, 217 N E(2d) 868 (1966).

RULE 703: BASES OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 703 specifies the bases for expert opinion
testimony. The rule provides that an expert may
base an opinion on data either (1) personally
observed by tl')e expert or (2) admitted in evidence.
Rule 703 must be read in conjunction with Rule
705, which requires an expert to disclose the
underlying bases of his opinion before giving the
opinion and makes the use of the hypothetical
question optional.
Personal Knowledge
Rule 703 provides that an expert may base an
opinion on his personal knowledge. Typical examples are the forensic chemist who analyzes and
testifies about the nature of a controlled substance or the pathologist who testifies about the
cause of death. The Ohio cases have long recognized that an expert may base an opinion on personal knowledge. See State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 36 OS(2d) 151, 304 NE(2d) 891
(1973); Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152
OS 6, 87 NE(2d) 156 (1949).
Opinions Based on Admitted Evidence
Rule 703 also provides that an expert may base
an opinion on facts or data "admitted in evidence
at the hearing." This is the second bases for expert opinions recognized by the rule. The first
basis is the personal knowledge of the expert. If
the expert has personal knowledge of all the
underlying data upon which his opinion is based,
there is no need to resort to this alternative basis.
The typical method of providing an expert, who
does not have personal knowledge, with the relevant information upon which to base an opinion is
the hypothetical question. Although a hypothetical
question may still be used, its use is not required
by the Rules of Evidence. Rule 705 explicitly provides that disclosure of the underlying basis of the
opinion "may be in response to a hypothetical
question or otherwise." The Staff Note to Rule 705
states: "Rule 705 does not require the use of the
hypothetical question .... [The expert) could be
··· advised of [facts] by counsel, he could hear them
adduced, or they could be stated to him in a hypothetical question." Consequently, there are three
ways in which an expert may be provided with
assumed facts upon which to base an opinion.
~
First, an expert present during the testimony of
other witnesses may base an opinion on that testimony. McCormick describes this method as
follows:

Opinions Based on Hearsay
Rule 703 does not permit an expert to base an
opinion on hearsay evidence, unless the evidence
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule and is
admitted at trial. In contrast, Federal Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible
and unadmitted hearsay evidence. According to
the federal rule, "[i]f of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence."
Because this provision was not adopted in Ohio,
the data upon which an expert bases an opinion
must be admitted in evidence.
RULE 704: OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule. The
ultimate issue prohibition was justified on the
3

ground that opinions on ultimate issues "invade
the province of the jury" or "usurp the function of
the jury." See Trebotich v. Broglio, 33 OS(2d) 57,
61, 294 NE(2d) 669, 672 (1973) ("clear invasion of
the jury's province on the precise ultimate fact
in issue.").
The ultimate issue rule was deficient for several
reasons. First, difficult questions of application
are involved in distinguishing "ultimate facts"
from other "facts." See C. McCormick, Evidence §
12 (2d ed. 1972). Second, the witness can never
usurp the function of the jury because the jury is
not bound to accept a witness' opinion, including
the opinion of an expert. See 7 J. Wignore, Evi·
dence § 1920 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). Finally, the
principal defect in the ultimate issue rule is that it
established the wrong standard for the admissibility of opinion testimony. The issue should be .
whether the opinion, lay or expert, assists the jury
and not whether the opinion relates to the ultimate
issues in the case. In many instances, the jury
needs an opinion on issues that could be classified as "ultimate." For example, in a forgery case
the only contested issue may be whether the defendant forged a check. A handwriting expert,
because of his training and experience, may be
able to answer that question. In such a case, an
opinion on the "ultimate issue" is both desirable
and necessary. The expert, however, would not be
permitted to testify that the defendant was
"guilty;" he may testify on whether, based on his
examination, he is of the opinion that known
exemplars and the check were written by the same
person. See Bell v. Brewster, 44 OS 690, 10 NE 679
(1887).
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not
mean that all opinions on ultimate issues are now
admissible. Rather, it means that the admissibility
of such opinions is determined by the standards
set forth in Rules 701 and 702. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 704 contains the following comment on this subject:

opinion. The rule also makes the use of the hypothetical question in eliciting expert opinion testimony optional.
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the jury
is aware of the facts upon which the opinion rests. ,-(
If the jury rejects those facts, it should also reject
the opinion. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 680
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). In addition, prior disclosure
provides the opposing party with the opportunity
to object on the ground that the opinion rests on
an impermissible basis, such as hearsay evidence.
RULE 801: HEARSAY DEFINITIONS

Rule 801 defines hearsay. Rule 802 governs the
admissibility of hearsay evidence. Under that rule
hearsay is inadmissible in the absence of an exception. Rules 803 and 804 specify twenty-seven
hearsay exceptions.
Subdivisions (A), (B), and (C) of Rule 801 set
forth a traditional definition of hearsay. Hearsay is
defined as a written or oral statement, including
conduct intended to be an assertion, made by a
declarant out-of-court and offered for the truth of
the assertions contained in the statement. In contrast subdivision (D) represents an important
chan'ge in Ohio law. That rule provides that certain
statements that would otherwise fall within the
definition of subdivisions (A)-(C) are not hearsay
and consequently not excludable as hearsay under
Rule 802. Rule 801(0)(1) provides that certain prior
inconsistent statements, prior consistent statements, and statements of identifications are not
hearsay. Rule 801(0)(2) provides that admissions of
a party-opponent are not hearsay.
The Rules of Evidence avoid the use of the term
res gestae because that confusing phrase encompasses evidence which is not hearsay as well as
evidence that is hearsay but may fall within one of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See C. McCormick, Evidence § 288 (2d ed. 1972).
Definition of "Statement"
Rule 801(A) de.fines a "statement" as "(1) an oral
or wr\itten assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."
Oral and written assertions clearly present the
hearsay dangers-Jack of cross-examination with
respect to the declarant's perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.
Rule 801 also treats nonverbal conduct intended
as an assertion (assertive conduct) as hearsay.
McCormick provides the following commentary
and illustration:

The abolition of. the ultimate issue rule does not lower
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact,
and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which
wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would
merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in
the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They
also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms
of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus, the question, "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be
excluded while the question, "Did T have sufficient
mental c~pacity to know the nature and extent of his
property and natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be
allowed.

[l]t must be observed that the line of cleavage between conduct and statements is one that must be
drawn in the light of substance, rather than form. No
one would contend, if, in response to. a question "Who
did it?", one of the auditors held up his hand, that
this gesture could be treated as different from an oral
or written statement, in the application of the hearsay
rule. Obviously, though described in terms of conduct,
the actions are as much a part of the speaker's effo~
at expression as his words are ... C. McCormick, Evidence 596 (2d ed. 1972).

RULE 705: DISCLOSURE OF
BASES OF EXPERT OPINIONS

Rule 705 governs the disclosure of the data or
facts upon which an expert's opinion is based. The
rule provides that disclosure of the facts or data
underlying an expert's opinion must precede the
4

The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule
801 provides another illustration: "Some nonverbal
conduct, such as the act of pointing to identify a
suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of
words, assertive in nature, and to be regarded as a
statement."
Conduct that is not intended to be an assertion
by the declarant is not encompassed by the definition of "statement" in Rule 801 (A). Consequently,
the hearsay rule is not a bar to the admissibility of
evidence of nonassertive conduct. Nonassertive
conduct is sometimes referred to as "implied
assertions." The leading case is Wright v. Doe
D'Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837), which held implied assertions or nonassertive conduct hearsay.
See C. McCormick, Evidence 597-600 (2d ed. 1972).
Rule 801(A) rejects this position. Thus, flight from
the scene of a crime is not hearsay under Rule 801
because such conduct is not intended to be an assertion. See State v. Fields, 35 App(2d) 140, 300
NE(2d) 207 (1973); State v. Whitley, 17 App(2d) 159,
245 N E(2d) 232 (1969).
Statements Offered for the Truth of the Assertion
Rule 801(C) defines hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." This definition is consistent with the prior Ohio cases. In
Potter v. Baker, 162 OS 488, 124 NE(2d) 140 (1955),
the court held: "Testimony of a witness as to a
statement or declaration by another person is
hearsay testimony where that statement or declaration is offered or used only to prove the truth of
the matters asserted therein." /d. (Syllabus,
para. 1).
If the relevance of an out-of-court statement is
that the statement was made and not the truth of
the assertion contained in the statement, the
statement is not hearsay. In such a case, the hearsay dangers are not present. The declarant's perception, memory, narration, and sincerity are not
__ critical because the relevance of the statement
does not depend on the veracity of the declarant.
See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 249 (2d ed. 1972); 6
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1766 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
A number of examples of statements not offered
for the truth of the matter asserted have been recognized. Several are discussed below.

Statements Offered to Show Effect on Hearer
In many criminal cases a person's state of mind
-his knowledge, belief, good faith, reasonableness- is an issue. See C. McCormick, Evidence
589-90 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1789
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). For example, if an accused
claims self-defense, his reasonable fear of the victim becomes an issue. Consequently, statements
made to the defendant informing him that the victim is a dangerous or violent person are relevant to
show his subjective state of mind. These statements are not offered to show that the victim was,
in fact, a dangerous or violent person, but only to
show that such information was communicated to
the defendant. See McGaw v. State, 123 OS 196,
174 NE 741 (1931); State v. Roderick, 77 OS 301, 82
NE 1082 (1907).
Statements Offered to Show Circumstantially
Declarant's State of Mind
A person's mental state is often a consequential
or material issue. If that person makes a statement
that manifests his state of mind, the statement is
relevant. Frequently, such statements are hearsay,
but fall within the exception for presently existing
state of mind. See Rule 803(3). In other cases, the
statements only circumstantially show the declarant's state of mind. In these cases the statement
is not offered to prove the truth of the assertion
and thus does not implicate the hearsay rule. See
C. McCormick, Evidence 590-93 (2d ed. 1972).
One of the more difficult examples involves
statements by a defendant offered to establish insanity. Thus, if the defendant has stated "I am the
Emperor of Africa," the statement is not offered to
prove that the defendant is the Emperor of Africa.
Instead, the statement is offered as evidence of
the defendant's insane delusions. This analysis,
however, is not free of criticism. See C. McCormick, Evidence 593 (2d ed. 1972); 6 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1766, at 250 & n.l. (Chadbourn rev.
1976).
Prior Inconsistent Statements
Rule 801(D)(1)(a) provides that certain types of
prior inconsistent statements are admissible as
substantive evidence. The rule accomplishes this
result by defining such statements as nonhearsay.
The following conditions must be satisfied before
a prior statement is admissible under the rule: (1)
the declarant must testify, subject to crossexamination, at the trial or hearing; (2) the prior
statement must be inconsistent with the witness'
trial testimony; (3) the prior statement must have
been given under oath; (4) the prior statement must
have been "subject to cross-examination by the
party against whom the statement is offered;" and
(5) the prior statement must have been "subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition ... "
The rule represents a change in Ohio law. Under
prior law, prior inconsistent statements were admissible only for impeachment; such statements
were not offered for the truth of assertion con-

Verbal Acts
The "verbal acts" rule involves verbal conduct
"to which the law attaches duties and liabilities."
C. McCormick, Evidence 588 (2d ed. 1972). In other
words, the uttering of certain words has independent legal significance under the substantive law.
See 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 1770 (Chadbourn rev.
1976). For example, words constituting an at" tempted bribe are verbal acts. These statements
~·-,are not offered to prove the truth of the assertion;
Sthey are offered in evidence only to show that the
;c; words were uttered. See also Staff Note ("Words
' constituting conduct are not hearsay, e.g., words
;_; of a contract, libel, slander, threats and the like.").
5

tained therein but only to show that the statement
was made and is inconsistent with the witness'
trial testimony. See McKelvey Co. v. General
Casualty Co., 166 OS 401, 405, 142 NE(2d) 854, 856
(1957); State v. Duffey, 134 OS 16, 24, 15 NE(2d)
535, 539 (1938).
Rule 801(D)(1)(a) differs from its federal counterpart. Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require that
the prior statement have been subject to crossexamination at the time it was made. Statements
made at a prior trial, a preliminary hearing, Grim.
R. 5(B), a deposition, Grim. R. 15, or any other proceding at which testimony is taken under oath
subject to penalty of perjury and crossexamination would qualify under Rule 80i(D)(1)(a).
In contrast to the federal rule, statements made
before a grand jury would not qualify because
such statements are not subject to crossexamination. Grand jury statements, however, are
admissible if offered for impeachment and inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. See
Rule 613.

tification. Under the rule, prior identifications are
admissible as substantive evidence and thus an incourt identification is not a prerequisite to
admissibility so long as the witness who has made
the prior identification is "subject to crossexamination" at trial. See Staff Note; United States ·
v. Ingram, 600 F(2d) 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Lewis, 565 F(2d) 1248, 1250-52 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 US 973 (1978).
As the Staff Note indicates, the rule does not
"obviate[] the constitutional requirements relating
to lineups and the like ... "The rule covers only
the hearsay aspects of pretrial identifications. In
criminal cases identification evidence also must
satisfy Sixth Amendment and due process requirements. The Sixth Amendment requires the presence of counsel at some types of identification
procedures. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 US 220 (1977)
(preliminary hearings); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 US 682
(1972) (right to counsel attaches at commencement
of judicial adversary proceedings); State v. Lathan,
30 OS(2d) 92, 282 N E(2d) 57 4 (1972).
Due process requires identification evidence to
be reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98
(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972); State v.
Madison, 64 OS(2d) 322 (1980); State v. Kaiser, 56
OS(2d) 29, 381 NE(2d) 633 (1978).

Prior Consistent Statements
Rule 801(D)(1)(b) provides that prior consistent
statements of a witness are admissible as substantive evidence if "offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive." The rule represents
a change in Ohio law. Under prior law, prior consistent statements were generally inadmissible
even if offered only for rehabilitation. Such statements, however, were admissible if offereo to
rebut a charge of recent fabrication, Miller v. Piqua
Transfer & Storage Co., 57 Abs 325, 92 NE(2d) 452
(CP 1950), in which case the statement could be
considered for rehabilitative purposes but not as
substantive evidence.
In contrast to the rule on prior inconsistent
statements, Rule 801(D)(1)(a), a prior consistent
statement need not be given under oath subject to
penalty of perjury and cross-examination.
Statement of Identification
Rule 801 (D)(i)(C) provides that a witness' prior
statement "of identification of a person soon after
perceiving" that person is admissible as substantive evidence "if the circumstances demonstrate
the reliability of the prior identification."
The rule apparently changes Ohio law. R.C.
2945.55 provides: "When identification of the defendant is an issue, a witness who has on a previous occasion identified such person may testify
to such previous identification. Such identification
m~y be proved by other witnesses." On its face,
this statute would appear to permit the substantive
use of prior identifications. In State v. Lancaster,
25 OS(2d) 83, 267 NE(2d) 291 (1971), however, the
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as permitting the use of prior identifications only as corroborative, as opposed to substantive, evidence. /d.
(syllabus, para. 5). Under the corroboration theory,
the witness had to make an in-court identification
prior to the admission of evidence of a prior iden-

Admissions of a Party-Opponent
Rule 801(D)(2) exempts admissions of a partyopponent from the scope of the hearsay rule. Rule
801(D)(2)(a) provides that statements of a party are 1
admissible as substantive evidence if offered
·
against that party. Numerous Ohio cases have recognized the admissibility of party admissions. See
generally Note, Admissions "Against Interest" in
Ohio, 15 Ohio St.L.J. 187 (1954).
The confession of a criminal defendant is an admission of a party-opponent. Some Ohio cases attempt to distinguish confessions and admissions,
confessions being a complete acknowl-edgment of
guilt whereas admissions are something less. See
State v. Klumpp, 15 Ops(2d) 461, 175 NE(2d) 767
(App. 1960). The distinction is not important. Both
confessions and admissions are admissible under
Rule 801(D)(2)(a) and the U.S. Supreme Court has
held the distinction irrelevant when a statement
obtained from a defendant by the police is challenged on constitutional grounds. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 US 436, 476-77 (1966).
Rule 801(D)(2)(a) governs only the hearsay
aspects of admissions. It is not concerned with
the constitutional requirements surrounding the
obtaining of statements from defendants by the
police. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)
(5th Amendment requirements); Brewer v. Williams,
430 US 387 (1977) (6th Amendment requirements).
See generally C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 14
(2d ed. 1972); C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure
ch. 15 (1980).
A plea of guilty in a criminal case is an admission of a party-opponent and thus may be admissible in a subsequent case. See Clinger v. Duncan
6
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166 OS 216, 141 NE(2d) 156 (1957); Freas v. Sullivan, 130 OS 486, 200 NE 639 (1936); Clark v. Irvin, 9
Ohio 131 (1839); Wilcox v. Gregory, 112 App 516,
176 NE(2d) 523 (1960). Rule 410, however, prohibits
the admissibility of guilty pleas that are subsequently withdrawn, pleas of no contest, pleas of
guilty in a violations bureau, offers to plead guilty
and no contest, and statements made in connection with and relevant to such pleas and offers.
Pleas of guilty not falling within the exclusion of
Rule 410 are admissible as admissions. See also
Rule 803(21) (admissibility of judgments of prior
convictions).

[against self-incrimination] at that time is silence
... he should not thereafter be penalized for his
original refusal." /d. at 81. See also State v. Perryman, 49 OS(2d) 14, 358 NE(2d) 1040 (1976), vacated
on other grounds, 438 US 911 (1978).
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610 (1976), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the examination of a defendant at trial concerning his post-arrest silence
after receiving Miranda warnings violated due
process. Consequently, a defendant's silence in
face of an accusation by the police, an accomplice, or victim cannot be admitted in evidence if
Miranda warnings were or should have been given.

Adoptive Admissions
Rule 801(D)(2)(b) provides that statements about
which a party "has manifested his adoption or
belief in its truth" are admissible as substantive
evidence if offered against that party. A party may
expressly adopt the statement of a third person or
he may acquiesce by failing to deny or correct the
statement of a third person under circumstances
in which it would be natural to deny or correct the
truth of the statement (adoption by silence). See
State v. Swiger, 5 OS(2d) 151, 159-60, 214 NE(2d)
417, 424 cert. denied, 385 US 874 (1966) (express
adoption); State v. Poole, 50 App(2d) 204, 362
NE(2d) 678 (1976) (express adoption).
The Ohio cases have recognized the admissionby-silence rule See Hoover v. State, 91 OS 41, 47,
109 NE 626, 628 (1914); Murphy v. State, 36 OS 628
(1881). In Zeller v. State, 123 OS 519, 176 NE 81
' '(1931), the Supreme Court stated: "The only theory
upon which any confession by silence is admissible is that the statement of the third person, in
the presence of the accused, is made under such
circumstances that the silence of the accused
gives rise to a natural and reasonable inference of
assent thereto ... " /d. at 523. In many cases,
however, the courts have found that the circum·
stances did not require a response. E.g., Ze/ler v.
State, supra; Geiger v. State, 70 OS 400, 71 NE 721
:____ (1904); Griffin v. Zipperwich and Lodge, 28 OS 388,
409 (1876); Walker v. State, 37 App 540, 175 NE 29
(1930). In Geiger v. State, supra, the court commented on the admissibility of "a confession by
silence": "We cannot refrain from the observation,
that before a court admits this class of confessions, great caution should be exercised ... It is
not every instance of silence in the hearing of accusation that renders it admissible, as admitting
guilt." /d. at 413.

Coconspirator Admissions
Rule 801 (D)(2)(e) provides that statements by a
coconspirator of a party made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible as substantive evidence if offered against that party. The
coconspirator rule applies if five conditions are
established: (1) the existence of a conspiracy,
(2) the defendant's participation in the conspiracy,
(3) the declarant's participation in the conspiracy,
(4) the statement was made during the course of
the conspiracy, and (5) the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. In many cases in
which conspiracy is charged, resort to this rule is
unnecessary. If the statement involved the agreement (the actus reus of conspiracy), the statement
may be admissible under the verbal acts doctrine.
See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence
357-61 (1980).
A conspiracy commences when the agreement
is reached and terminates when the objectives
have been achieved or abandoned. See R.C.
2923.01 (E). Once the conspiracy ends, statements
of coconspirators are not admissible. See Sharpe
v. State, 29 OS 263 (1876). Determining the time
when the conspiracy terminates has proven to be a
troublesome issue. Termination depends on the
objectives of the conspiracy. The traditional view
is that statements made after the objectives have
been achieved, but while the conspirators are attempting to avoid detection (the concealment
phase) are inadmissible. C. McCormick, Evidence
646 (2d ed. 1972). The Ohio Supreme Court has not
always followed this rule. In Sfate v. Shelton, 51
OS(2d) 68, 364 NE(2d) 1152 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 US 909 (1978), the Court held: "A
declaration of a conspirator, made subsequent to
the actual commission of the crime, may be admissible against any coconspirator if it was made
while the conspirators were still concerned with
the concealment of their criminal conduct or their
identity." /d. (syllabus, para. 2). Accord, State v.
DeRighter, 145 OS 552, 558-59, 62 NE(2d) 332,
335-336 (1945).
Concealment phase statements, however, are
not admissible under Rule 801(D)(2)(e). The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 801 reads:
"The rule is consistent with the position of the
Supreme Court in denying admissibility to statements made after the objectives of the conspiracy
have either failed or been achieved. Krulewitch v.

The application of the adoption-by-silence rule in
criminal cases is limited by constitutional principles. In State v. Stephens, 24 OS(2d) 76, 263
NE(2d) 773 (1970), the Supreme Court commented
on the admissibility of a defendant's silence following arrest: "In the first detention of a suspect it
:;;c is not uncommon to react by refusing to discuss
~t-\ the charges until a lawyer can be retained. Desire
£pfor friendly counsel and advice can be a major mo~,;iJivation at that time in the mind of one completely
~'. innocent of the charges, as well as one who subi~~~equently may admit his guilt. His privilege
i:?t'\-:.
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the introduction of _evidence sufficient to S'upport a
finding of the fulfillment of the condition." If Rule
_104(B) governs, the prima facie case standard applies. The "introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition" is equivalent to requiring a prima facie case
of conspiracy. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence ,104[05] (1980).
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence,
the Ohio cases had used the prima facie case
standard. See State v. Thomas, 61 OS(2d) 223, 232,
400 NE(2d) 401, 407 (1980); State v. Weind, 50
OS(2d) 224, 240, 364 NE(2d) 216, 235 (1977), vacated
on other grounds, 438 US 911 (1978). It is questionable, however, whether the prima facie standard
survived the adoption of the Rules of Evidence.
The majority of federal courts that have considered
the issue have held that Federal Rule 104(a) governs admissibility, i.e., the court alone determines
the existence of a conspiracy. See United States v.
Petersen, 611 F(2d) 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Pappas, 611 F(2d) 399, 405 (1st Cir.
1979); United States v. James, 590 F(2d) 575, 579-80
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 US 917 (1979); United
States v. Enright, 579 F(2d) 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978).

United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed.
790 (1949); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 490, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.(2d) 441 (1963)." The
federal rule, as stated in Kru/ewitch and Wong
Sun, has consistently excluded concealment
phase statements.
Independent Evidence; Standard of Proof
Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E) has been the source of
controversy. A number of issues have divided the
federal courts: (1) whether the conspiracy may be
established by the statement itself or only by independent proof; (2) whether the admissibility of coconspirator statements is controlled by Federal
Rule 104(a) or by Rule 104(b); and (3) the standard
of proof. See 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal
Evidence 207-14 (1977); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence ,104[05] (1980).
The first issue is resolved by the Rules of Evidence. The Ohio rule requires that the conspiracy,
-as well as the declarant's and defendant's participation, be established "upon independent proof of
the conspiracy."
Determining whether admissibility of coconspirator statements is governed by Rule 104(A) or Rule
104(B) and determining the standard of proofprima facie case, preponderance of evidence, or
some other standard-involves related issues.
Rule 104(A) provides that the court shall determine
questions concerning "the admissibility of evidence." That provision, however, is subject to Rule
104(B), which provides: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to,

The majority of federal courts have also endorsed the preponderance of evidence standard.
See United States v. Pappas, 611 F(2d) 399, 404-05
(1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Continental Group,
Inc., 603 F(2d) 444, 457 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 US 1032 (1980); United States v. James, 590
F(2d) 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442
US 917 (1979); United States v. Bell, 573 F(2d) 1040
(8th Cir. 1978).

I i

\~

8

